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Abstract 
In recent years the topic of corruption has attracted a great deal of attention. However, there is still a 
lack of substantial empirical evidence about the determinants of corruption. Despite an increasing 
interest of economists in the determinants of corruption, the factor of marriage has been widely 
neglected in the literature. The results suggest a positive but ambiguous effect marriage on 
corruption. 
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1. Introduction 
In recent years the topic of corruption has attracted a great deal of attention. Research 
has recently focused on the determinants of corruption (KodilaTedika, 2012; 
AbdiweliandIsse, 2003; Lambsdorff, 2006; Montinola andJackman, 2002; Park, 2003; 
Seldadyoand de Haan, 2006; Shabbirand Anwar, 2007; Treisman, 2000) which include 
political institutions, global economic integration, the size of the shadow economy, business 
cycles, social trust and others variables (gender, age, intelligence, family, etc.). Only recently 
were nonconventional variables introduced into the regressions. 
Despite an increasing interest of economists in the determinants of corruption, the factor 
of marriage has been widely neglected in the literature. From the data of investigation in the 
Congolese (DRC) magistrates, taxi drivers and police officers and probit model, 
Nakamwambila Kiadiamuyika and Kabanga Kazadi (2007) find that, ceteris paribus, married 
people have a higher probability to agree to be corrupted than the non-married, given the 
costly family burden. Mocan (2008) uses microlevel data set from 49 countries to create a 
direct measure of corruption, which portrays the extent of bribery as revealed by individuals 
who live in those countries to show an effect of civil status on corruption. It confirms that the 
marital status is a cause of corruption, but one does not find an effect statistically significant 
for the case of the marriage. In this paper we focus more on marriage1, better than the above 
mentioned articles. We thus try to disentangle these two results. In addition, this article uses 
different data, such as European data over the period from 2002 to 2009. This focus on social 
norms fits better the interdisciplinary literature on marriage.  
 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section II presents the data and estimation 
strategy. Section III examines marriage effect of corruption and the conclusions are given in 
                                                             
1
In Kodila-Tedika, O. , Azia-Dimbu, F. and Kalemany, C. (2012), “Divorce and Corruption: analyze 
empirical on European data”, Kinshasa University Working paper; we are interested in the relation 
corruption and divorce. 
section 4 . 
 
2. Data and estimation strategy 
The base-line econometric model has the following form: 
 
With Cor denotes the corruption, Mar indicate the marriagewe measure marriage using 
crude marriage rate in EU-27 (marriages per 1,000 inhabitants). The source is Demography 
report of Eurostat (to see figure 1 to identify the evolution of the marriage in time within EU-
27). 
Figure 1.Evolution of crude marriage rate in EU-27 (marriages per 1,000 inhabitants) 
 
The vector X contains the. we include the Gender, Dev, Inf, Health, Den, Edu and UE. 
It is necessary to consider table 1 to have the definition of each variable, and theirdescriptive 
statistics are reported in Table 2 (cf. table 1 and 2 in annexes).All the variables of control are 
obtained from the World Development Indicators of the World Bank. In addition, we will not 
comment on the coefficients of variables of control. 
To measure corruption, we use the Control of corruption (CC). The index assumes 
values between 2,5 (no corruption) and -2,5 (extreme corruption). The CC has often been used 
in empirical research on corruption (see the studies mentioned in section 1). 
We estimate the model with ordinary least squares (OLS) and robust standard errors 
(Eicker-White). We use fixed-effects, after the result of Hausmann test. This empirical study 
usesuse data from 26 euorpean countries over the period from 2002 to 2009. This study 
adopts the data from 27 countries : Belgium (BE); Bulgaria (BG); The Czech Republic 
(CZ);Denmark (DK); Estonia (EE); Ireland (IE) ; Greece (EL); Spain (ES); France (FR), 
including overseas territories; 'Metropolitan France' excludes overseas territories; Italy (IT); 
Cyprus (CY); Latvia (LV); Lithuania (LT); Luxembourg (LU); Hungary (HU); Malta (MT); 



























(SI); Slovakia (SK); Finland (FI); Sweden (SE) and The United Kingdom (UK). 
 
 
3. Empirical Results 
3.1 Basic results 
Table 3 shows the base-line regression results. The control of variables do not always 
display the expected signs and are not statistically significant in several cases. Within the 
framework of the relative relevance of our variable of interest (marriage), one notices that it is 
significant in all the cases. Its effect becomes significantly since there is interaction between 
the variable of interest and the vulnerability of variables (unemployment, social contribution 
and vulnerability of employment). Here, for the all cases, an increase in the vulnerability 
involves a positive effect of marriage on corruption. 
Table 3. Regression Results. 
Regressors Dependant variable: Cor 
















Mar * Vun    -0,00 
(0,00) 
Mar * UE   0,01 
(0,01) 
 
















































































Obs. 207 207 207 207 
Notes: Absolute value of Std. Err. in brackets; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%;*** significant at 1%. 
3.2 Robustness checks 
Given the nature of our data and study, to test the robustness of the results is not 
obvious.In order to check the robustness of the results we divided the sample into two groups: 
Pov1 and Pov0.The criterion of division being the standard of living in the sample.The 
countries of the Pov1 group are those whoseLog PIB per capita higher than the average, and the 




Table 4.RegressionResults (Robustness) 
Regressors Dependant variable: Cor  





























    








































































































































































Obs. 123 84 123 84 123 84 123 84 
Pov 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 
4. Conclusion 
This article aimed at studying the relation between marriage and corruption. Using 
panel data of the European countries, we do validate the direct effect of marriage on 
corruption, at least on our sample. The increase in the number of marriage would push up 
corruption. Also, it is possible to find an effect of the marriage on corruption in the event of 
interaction with variables of vulnerability.  
But, these results are not also obvious, insofar as the conclusion seems changing since 
one breaks up the sample into rich group on the one hand and into poor group on the other 
hand.It is necessary to seek to refine these preliminary results. 
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Annexes 
Table 1 Variables description 
Variables  Definitions 
Cor Transparency International's Perception of Corruption Index (CPI) 
Vun Vulnerable employment, total (% of total employment) 
Contr Contributing family workers, total (% of total employed) 
Gender Employers, female (% of employment) 
Mar Crude marriage rate in EU-27 (marriages per 1,000 inhabitants) 
Log GDP 
per capita Log GDP per capita PPP (constant 2005 US$) 
Inf Inflation, consumer prices (annual %) 
Health Life expectancy at birth, total (years) 
Density Population density (people per sq. km of land area) 
Edu Schoolenrollment, tertiary (% gross) 
UE Unemployment, total (% of total labor force) 
Table 2 Descriptive statistics 
     Variable |       Obs        Mean    Std. Dev.       Min        Max 
-------------+-------------------------------------------------------- 
marriage |       207     5.05058     1.22524       2.88      14.48 
corruption |       208    1.084165    .7506046  -.3430586   2.466556 
contr|       208    2.050481    2.839899          0       15.1 
marcontr |       207    11.22059    18.32023          0    110.628 
UE  |       208    7.680288    3.462881        2.6       19.9 
marunemp |       207    38.10398     17.2046     11.778    100.352 
vuln |       208    12.31971     6.96197        2.8       36.6 
marvuln |       207    64.51841    47.30167     12.684    282.716 
Gender |       208    2.223077    .9624577         .7        7.6 
GDPpercapita |       208       25718    12103.18   7819.328   74113.94 
inf |       208    3.251436    2.911372  -4.479938   22.53721 
Health |       208    77.15333    3.156709   70.86585   81.47561 
Density |       208    170.9691    241.3267   17.07409   1293.722 
Edu |       208    58.81242    17.83476   10.34032   95.07212 
 
 
